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Introduction
In the last decade smartphones have infiltrated every aspect of life, and many everyday tasks
have been eliminated by their use including, but not limited to: note taking, surfing the web,
and even car alarm systems. Smartphone technology has allowed easy overhauling of
countless other technologies as well. One specific item that has not been improved with
technology is portable locks. The technology behind traditional locks and padlocks has been
around for two centuries, and the earliest known use of the lock dates back to 4000 B.C. in
Egypt (Rathjen 79). With thousands of years to iterate the design, the mechanics of locks are
simple, yet effective. Current portable locks are called pin-tumbler locks because of the
mechanics the device uses. Pins are cut in different lengths and once each individual pin is
raised to the proper height the lock can open. Unfortunately, the pin tumbler mechanism
lends these locks to a very simple, yet proven attack: lock picking. Lock picking allows for a
skilled adversary to open locks they should not have access to by exploiting mechanical
defects of the lock. These defects allow for a malevolent user to reduce the number of
locking mechanisms (or pins) from four, five, or six down to one at a time. Since the user
only needs to worry about 1 mechanism at a time, it becomes incredibly easy to defeat the
lock.
Almost every smartphone created includes a modern networking standard called Bluetooth.
Bluetooth is a WPAN standard used for creating small Wireless Personal Area Networks
that allows for communication between devices in relatively close proximity to one another
(“Bluetooth Basics”). Bluetooth devices are everywhere and are being used everyday. The
most common Bluetooth devices that users interact with are hands-free cellular devices and
Bluetooth headsets/speaker systems.
The purpose of this project is to combine the technologies in smartphones and locks to
create a secure padlock that is opened by a phone application running on Android OS
through the Bluetooth communication standard. This included developing a security
protocol to make the device impervious to Bluetooth replay attacks and wireless sniffing.
The security protocol was developed and is runnable on both the Arduino Uno (the
microcontroller used for prototype development) and the Android phone, the Motorola
Droid Razr Maxx. The device is also battery powered and self-sustaining creating a low
maintenance locking solution.

Background
Bluetooth Communication
There are many pieces of background information needed to understand the project
implementation. The first is the Bluetooth communication specifications. The Bluetooth
protocol operates in the license free band from 2.402 GHz to 2.480 GHz. This license free
band is divided into 79 different channels of 1MHz, and the device channel changes 1600
times per second (“Bluetooth Basics”). This frequency hopping allows Bluetooth devices to
avoid other devices that are within range, and creates a small amount of security for the
connection. The band-jumping scheme is determined by a multitude of factors including the
device address, timestamps of connection, and a shared key. These values are shared

between the master and slave devices upon the initial connection. The channel-hopping
scheme is then calculated for both master and slave and from this point forward all
communication happens during channel hopping. Bluetooth communication chips can be
purchased at any electronics vendor, and all chips must conform to the Bluetooth standard
outlined by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group or SIG.
The Arduino Uno is a development board used in many classes at California Polytechnic
State University. The Arduino Uno is based on the ATMega328 chipset and includes access
to system interrupts, timers, registers, and other low level interfaces. The Arduino Uno
operates at 5V and has a clock rate of 16 Mega Hertz. The board can be ran at other
voltages, but these options do not apply to this project. The Arduino Uno also has 32 Kilo
Bytes of RAM and has 14 digital I/O pins (“ArduinoBoardUno”). The programs are written
in either C or C++, and there is a large, highly supported framework that is used for
development on the board.
There are two sleep states on the Arduino Uno; the first is a very low power (in the Pico or
10-12 Watt range) that can only be awakened by an external pin interrupt. Only two digital
pins on the Arduino Uno (digital pins 0 and 1) have the capability to be used an external pin
interrupt pin change or pin high (“ArduinoBoardUno”). The second sleep cycle consumes
more power, but can be controlled using any of the interrupts on the board (timer interrupts,
etc.). For this project the low power sleep cycles were used to minimize battery demand, and
data transfer from the Bluetooth chip triggers the external interrupt.
Common Attack Vectors for Bluetooth Devices
There are many attack vectors for Bluetooth devices. The first and most common is a replay
attack of the data that was sent initially. A malicious user can use listening devices to “sniff”
traffic sent across the frequencies that Bluetooth operates on. An attacker then broadcasts
the same data over the same frequencies. If the device is not secured then this attack vector
is exploited allowing for the device to be compromised. A non-deterministic value in the
messages is the best way to prevent replay attacks. Many times this non-deterministic value is
a timestamp or some sort of random number.
The second main attack vector is sniffing Bluetooth frequency traffic and decoding the
messages that are sent. There is a small amount of inherent security contained within the
frequency-hopping scheme of which Bluetooth operation employs, but there are
mathematical attacks that can easily determine the hopping scheme. A malicious user could
find the addresses of the device then use a mathematical attack to determine the shared key.
Knowing the shared key would allow for the user to predict the frequency-hopping scheme
and once the hopping scheme is determined it is very easy for the attacker to read the
messages that are being sent. Then the attacker can duplicate these messages and exploit the
device. Cryptographic systems can lessen the impact of this attack vector.
AES Encryption
AES stands for Advanced Encryption Standard. AES has been adopted by the United States
government for both security and privacy, and is used in many other applications worldwide.
According to Schwartz the United States adopted AES encryption in 2001 after previously

using DES. Schwartz continues by saying that “Cryptographers have constructed computer
systems that could quickly crack DES messages.” The search for a new encryption algorithm
began in January 1997 and in October of 2000 after putting each submission through
grueling tests to find the best candidate AES encryption won out (Schwartz). The United
States government determined that while all submissions were secure enough for unclassified
information, only AES was secure enough for classified information.
AES is based on the Rijndel cipher and includes key rotations, shifts, and many other
operations that prevent determining the key from the encrypted message. The starting
message is called the plaintext, and the encrypted message is called the ciphertext. There are
four operations that occur on the plaintext, and this process is repeated 10 times. The final
product of the Rijndel cipher creates a ciphertext that is unique to each key and message
combination. There are currently mathematical attacks against AES, but with a proper
implementation the mathematical attacks do not make brute force feasible (Ou).
Public- Key Encryption
The fundamental idea of public-key encryption is that it is an asymmetric system, which
means that two different keys are given to the sender and the receiver. “Anyone can encrypt
a message using the public key, but only the owner of the private key will be able to read it”
(“SSL/TLS Strong Encryption: An Introduction”). The public key can be given to anyone
who will be sending messages to the receiver. The private key and public key are linked
mathematically, but the private key can’t be derived from the public key. This creates a
secure message-passing scheme so that only the person intended to receive the message is
able to decrypt the ciphertext.
These two schemes are both very secure, but during the design of a low-power lock,
everything must be taken into account including clock cycles and running time of each
solution. The current written libraries for both of these encryption schemes are stable and
well maintained. For this project only a single block of message is being sent between the
Android phone and the Bluetooth device. The RSA (public/private key encryption) library
takes 500 milliseconds for encryption with 20 seconds decryption per block (Sethi). The
AES library takes about 60 milliseconds per block for both encryption and decryption. This
is a huge time difference and would greatly affect the time to manipulate the lock along with
power consumption of the device. These considerations make AES the prime choice for
encryption for this project.
Now, it is necessary to address how to make each message different. Without an
initialization vector, timestamp, or similar method messages can be replayed to the device
and compromise it. The first solution provided was to include a timestamp in the message.
The problem is that the Arduino Uno does not support keeping time during sleep cycles,
and the time is reset each time the board resets (“ArduinoBoardUno”). There are hardware
add-ons that can be used for keeping track of time, but they are expensive and require
constant electrical power to run both of these characteristics are undesirable in a portable
lock.
The other commonly used system is challenge response authentication. The challenge
response authentication verifies identity by requiring a proper response to be issued from a

given challenge. A very common challenge is requiring that the response be the onescompliment of a given random number. This requires that the responder can both calculate
the response and decrypt the challenge message. Challenge-response authentication also
prevents the need for a cryptographic nonce (non-repeating challenge), which is a fairly
complicated implementation on a low power development board. Although a cryptographic
nonce is not necessary, there still needs to be a source for a random challenge.
Android Application Development
Android application development is done in Java using the Android development toolkit
provided from Google. There are a few changes from the standard Java 1.6 library, but all
changes are small, and mostly necessary for programming on a mobile device. The most
important aspect of programming Android devices is to understand the Android Activity
lifecycle (Meier). Every different action you take on an Android phone is considered an
activity. There are certain times when activities are created, started, paused, and destroyed. In
order to make an Android application that functions well it is necessary to understand the
conditions that make an activity restart, pause, or destroy and take the proper action in each
case.

Description of Implementation
Hardware
There are six pieces of
hardware that were used
during the implementation.
The servo that was employed
for the unlocking motion was
a small servo with low power
consumption. The operating
voltage of the servo is 4.8-6.0
volts, and the servo outputs
1.4kg/cm torque. This torque
is enough to complete the
mechanical motion to open
the lock. The second piece of
hardware was the Li-po
battery. The battery operates
at 3.7V and has a charge
capacity of 2000mAH. The
battery is connected to the integrated charging/voltage step up circuit. This circuit board
takes the 3.7V output from the battery and steps it up to 5V, which is the running voltage
for the Arduino Uno and the Bluetooth chip. The charging circuit connected to the device
also includes a step up voltage transformer and regulator for the charging input. There are
two ways to charge the device; the first is to use a USB cable connected to the charging
circuit and the second is the solar panel connected to the lock. The voltage regulator in the
charging circuit is required for charging with the solar cell due to voltage and amperage

fluctuations depending on sky conditions. The final piece of hardware is the Bluetooth chip.
This chip controls the Bluetooth connection, pairing, data transfer, and sleeping of the
Bluetooth device. This is the key hardware component for the device. The Bluetooth chip
used was a Bluetooth Mate Silver Pro designed by Sparkfun Industries. The Bluetooth Mate
silver is a low power model running at 5 volts with an average power consumption of 25
milliamps.
The Arduino Uno stays in a sleep state that waits for data transfer from the Bluetooth chip
to wake; this keeps the power consumption of the development board at minimal levels. The
Bluetooth chip is low power and is always on waiting for a connection from an approved
device. Once data is transferred from the Bluetooth chip to the Arduino Uno, the Arduino
wakes up and reads the message. If the message is the correct message to start an
authentication process then the Arduino Uno creates a challenge, which is simply a random
number seeded with an analog read of an external unconnected pin. If a hacker had access to
the internals of the
device this value could
be changed to no longer
be random, but in the
current implementation,
access to the device in
this way renders all other
security useless. An
unconnected pin on the
Arduino Uno fluctuates
quite a bit, and can range
from 0 – 4.9 Volts. This
voltage
is
always
changing due to outside
ambient electromotive
forces,
outside
magnetism, radio communications including Bluetooth, states of connected devices (this
includes the solar cell and servo), and current battery charge. The random number (32 bits
long) is then appended to the message, and the entire message is encrypted then sent across
the Bluetooth connection. The Arduino then awaits the reply message. Once the reply is
received it decrypts the message and determines whether the response is correct. If the
response is correct the servo is turned on and rotated to open the lock, if the response is
incorrect the lock stays closed and the device resumes its sleep cycle. Only users who have
access to the correct AES encryption key and device address are allowed to connect
preventing denial of service (DOS) for a noisy, or lots of radio signals, area. The channel
hopping scheme also prevents denial of service and interference for noisy areas.
Software

The
Android
application
development was designed with user
experience in mind. The Android
application has two main paths: the
storing of addresses and keys, and
the opening of the lock. The storing
of the addresses and keys is done
using a QR barcode scanner. The
idea behind this is that a user could
buy a lock from their local hardware
store and instead of having a
combination with their lock there is
a QR barcode that can be scanned
into the application. This would be a
seamless and easy way to contain the
necessary information of the AES
key and the address of the device
(AES key is 16 bytes long, and the
Bluetooth address is 32 bytes long).
The keys would be encrypted and
stored on the provided private database that each Android application has allocated to it.
The database for each Android application is private which would prevent other applications
from attempting to access the information. The second code path is the opening of the lock.
By operating the interface and selecting any lock from the device list the Android application
would begin connecting to the device. Once connection is completed the Android
application will then send the necessary message to the hardware to begin the challenge
response authentication. The Android application then waits to receive the ciphertext that
was encrypted on the hardware. The cipher text is then decoded, the response calculated,
and a new message is created which now includes the proper response for authentication.
This message is sent to the hardware, and the Arduino app reverts to the home screen
waiting for more user input.

Evaluation
Security
The security design behind this device is similar to many modern security devices currently
being used, including devices such as hotel door locks. AES encryption with challenge
response authentication prevents replay attacks by changing the challenge during each
authentication session. Creating a random number on the hardware for the challenge and
requiring that the response be the full 32-bit ones-compliment means that, statistically, for an
attacker to guess a response it is required to brute force 232 different responses. Each
challenge response authentication session has its own challenge that adds another layer of
complexity. With encryption built on top of the challenge response authentication, any
malicious user attempting to sniff traffic will only have access to the ciphertext (encrypted

message), preventing guessing of the challenge or response. The AES encryption will also
prevent derivation of the encryption key due to the non-linearity properties of the Rijndel
cipher.
Power Consumption
The power consumption of the project was also tested and came in at an acceptable range.
During idle states the consumption of the device was, on average, 40 milliamp. A connection
and open cycle raised the power consumption to 80 milliamp for about one second. This
means that the device could run on the 2000 milliamphours battery for 50 hours, which is
over 2 days. The solar cell has an output of 4.94 volts at 94 milliamp that is around .5 watt
output. The solar cell could run the device indefinitely with a proper light source, and could
reasonably charge the battery during any other condition. There are numerous other ways to
lower the power consumption further, but the levels reached were perfectly acceptable for
the project specification.

Conclusion
The project was successful. The final product is a secure, working, lightweight lock that can
be opened from any Android smartphone. The power consumption and recharge rate of the
solar panel created a device with an excellent run time, and the application provides a clean
user interface. Connecting and unlocking the device is seamless, and takes under a second
for the operation to complete. This technology could be marketed in a plethora of ways
including adding on to existing systems in houses, padlocks, and even cars. The main point
of the system created was a secure way to transfer electronic signals into a form of motion
that would unlock a device. This makes the possibilities endless for applications.
There are many directions that this project could take from this point onward. The first, and
most important work would be to condense the entire system onto one chip. This would
allow for the power consumption to be lowered even more, and perhaps provide seamless
integrations with current lock hardware as a drop in replacement module. Another direction
is to create web-service that would store the AES keys and addresses of locks that the user is
able to open. This would allow for users to share keys with others, and even limit access to
certain timeframes or number of open cycles. Another step would be to create the option of
password protecting the application so that an unauthorized user that has received access to
the phone would not be able to compromise the security of the locking device. The final
step would be to explore the possibilities of creating an iPhone application. During this
project connection with an iPhone was outside of scope because research found that
connecting with an iPhone requires extra hardware to connect via Bluetooth. The process
require extra testing to determine whether extra hardware was in fact needed, and whether
this would limit the marketability of the product.
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